Recently, Lu et al. claimed that Xie et al.'s three-party password-authenticated key agreement protocol (3PAKA) using chaotic maps has three security vulnerabilities; in particular, it cannot resist offline password guessing attack, Bergamo et al.'s attack and impersonation attack, and then they proposed an improved protocol. However, we demonstrate that Lu et al.'s attacks on Xie et al.'s scheme are unworkable, and their improved protocol is insecure against stolen-verifier attack and off-line password guessing attack. Furthermore, we propose a novel scheme with enhanced security and efficiency. We use formal verification tool ProVerif, which is based on pi calculus, to prove security and authentication of our scheme. The efficiency of the proposed scheme is higher than other related schemes.
Introduction
Nowadays it is very common to use mobile devices to conduct transactions via insecure wireless networks [1] [2] , therefore, how to design secure, efficient and convenient 3PAKA scheme has become an urgent issue for researchers to solve it. Utilizing the semi-group property of Chebyshev polynomial, many extended chaotic maps based 3PAKA protocols were proposed in recent years. However, most of them suffer from security vulnerabilities and low computational efficiency.
In 1995, Steiner et al. [3] extended two-party password-authenticated key agreement to 3PAKA protocol. However, Ding and Horster [4] and Lin et al. [5] demonstrated that their scheme is vulnerable to undetectable online password guessing attack, and Lin et al. [5] further showed that their protocol suffers from offline password guessing attack. To remedy those weaknesses, they proposed an improved 3PAKA protocol, but the server needs to keep a longterm secret key and the parties have to verify server's public key beforehand. To improve the efficiency, Lin et al. [6] introduced another 3PAKA protocol without using server's public key. Unfortunately, Chang and Chang [7] pointed out that their improved scheme needs more PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203984 October 5, 2018 1 / 17 a1111111111 a1111111111 a1111111111 a1111111111 a1111111111
3. Resistant to impersonation attack: The legal user must not be masqueraded by the unauthorized entities.
4. Resistant to password guessing attacks: The password of each user is secure even if the leakage of user's memory.
5. Resistant to replay attack: The improvement should be able to security against the reusage of the transmitted messages.
6. Resistant to privileged-insider attack: The privileged-insider must not be obtained the plaintext password of each user.
7. Resistant to man-in-the-middle attack: The improvement can withstand this attack if it will not be compromised under impersonation attack and replay attack.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. ' s improved protocol and our security analysis on it. After that, an improved protocol is introduced in Section 6. Security analysis and computation comparisons are presented in Sections 7 and 8. Section 9 concludes the paper.
Review of Xie et al.'s scheme
Xie et al.'s protocol [23] has four phases: system initialization phase, user registration phase, authenticated key agreement phase, and password change phase. The first three phases are as follows.
System initialization
Let s be the secret key of the server S, p be a large prime number, h() be a secure one-way hash function, H() be a chaotic maps based one-way hash function, and x2Z p , the parameters {p, h (), x, H()} are published and s is kept secret.
User registration
Let UID i and upw i be user i's identity and password. User i computes UPW i ¼ T upw i ðxÞmodp, and sends {UID i ,UPW i } to S through a secure channel.
When the server S receives {UID i ,UPW i }, it computes VUPW i = h(UID i ,s)+UPW i , and stores {UID i ,VUPW i } in its database.
Authenticated key agreement
In this phase, both user A and user B are authenticated and the session key is established.
Step 1: User A selects a random number ua2 [1,p+1] , and computes UR A = T ua (x)mod p, and sends {UID A ,UID B ,UR A } to S.
Step 2: When S receives {UID A ,UID B ,UR A }, it chooses c,d2 [1,p+1] 
System initialization
Let p be a large prime number, Sk2 [1,p+1] and T Sk (x)mod p be the private and public keys of the server S, where x2Z p . Let h 1 () be a secure one-way hash function and h() be a chaotic maps based one-way hash function. S keeps Sk secret and publishes the parameters {p,x,h 1 (),h(), T Sk (x)mod p}.
User registration
User i chooses his identity UID i , a random number r i and password upw i , and computes VG i = h 1 (upw i ,r i ), and sends {UID i ,VG i } to S through a private channel.
When the server S receives{UID i ,VG i } from the user i, it computes VUPW i = h 1 (UID i ,Sk)+VG i , and randomly chooses d i , stores {d i ÈSk,VUPW i } in its database, sends {d i ,VUPW i }to user i through a private channel. user i stores {r i ,d i } in his memory.
Authenticated key agreement
In this phase, both A and B are authenticated and the session key is established.
Step 1:
, and then he sends CV A to S.
Step 2: Step
and checks whether FV
A = h(UID A ,UID B ,T ua (x), VG A ) is correct or not. If not correct, reject it. Otherwise, S computes FV B = h(T ua (x),UID B ), VG B = VUPW B −h 1 (UID B ,Sk), CV B ¼ E VG B ðT
4: S decrypts PV B , gets (T ub (x),HV B ), and checks if HV B = h(UID B ,T ub (x)). If not, reject it. Otherwise, S chooses C1,C22[1,p+1] and computes ZV AS
= h(UID A ,UID B ,T ub (x),T C1 (x)), KAS ¼ T Sk ðT d A ðxÞÞ, RV AS = E KAS (T C1 (x),T ub (x),UID A ,ZV AS ), ZV BS = h(UID A ,UID B ,T ua (x), T C2 (x)), KBS = T Sk (T ub (x)), RV BS = E KBS (T C2 (x),T ua (x),UID B ,
ZV BS ), and returns RV AS to A, RV BS to B.
Step 5: When A obtains RV AS , he decrypts RV AS and gets (T C1 (x),T ub (x),UID A ,ZV AS ), then verifies whether ZV AS = h(UID A ,UID B ,T ub (x),T C1 (x)) is correct or not. If yes, A computes SK AB = T ua (T ub (x))mod p, VAB = h(UID A ,SK AB ), and sends VAB to B.
B verifies the validity of ZV BS = h(UID A ,UID B ,T ua (x),T C2 (x)), and computes SK AB = T ub (-T ua (x))mod p, VBA = h(UID B ,SK AB ), and sends VBA to A.
Step 6: A and B check the validity of VBA and VAB, respectively. If the checking holds, SK AB = T ua (T ub (x))mod p is the shared session key between A and B.
Analysis on Lu et al.'s protocol
In this section, we show that Lu et al.'s claims are not correct.
Off line password guessing attack
In Lu et al.'s protocol, an adversary can get the verification parameters {r i ,d i } stored in users' mobile terminals by side-channel attack [32] [33] [34] 
) and checks whether it is equal to FV B 0 . If yes, the guessed password is correct. Otherwise, the adversary can do it again untill he gets the correct password.
The adversary can obtain user A's password by using the above method. Therefore, Lu et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to offline password guessing attack.
Stolen-verifier attack
In Lu et al.'s protocol, the server needs to store the verifier messages {d i ÈSk,VUPW i } for each user i. Obviously, the registered adversary C has his/her own {d C ,VUPW C }. If he/she obtains the verifier messages {d i ÈSk,VUPW i } from the database of the server, then he/she can launch stolen-verifier attack. That is to say, the adversary can find d C ÈSk from VUPW C , then he/she can compute server's private key Sk = d C ÈSkÈd C . After this, the adversary can compute each user's message and launch server impersonation attack.
Improved scheme
Our improved protocol also has four phases: system initialization, user registration, authenticated key agreement, and password change.
System initialization
The parameters {Sk,p,x,h 1 (),h(),T Sk (x)mod p} are the same as that of Lu et al.'s scheme, and let H() be biological information hash function.
User registration
When the server S receives {UID i ,VG i } from the user i, it computes VUPW i = h 1 (UID i ,Sk) +VG i , and stores {UID i ,VUPW i } in its database, sends VUPW i to user i through a private channel.
User i inputs his biometrics UBIO i , and computes
Authenticated key agreement
In this phase, both A and B are authenticated and the session key is established (Please see Algorithm 1).
Step 1: User A enters his or her biometrics UBIO A and upw A , computes H(UBIO A ,upw A ) and checks if it equals to d A . If not, repeat this process. A selects Ua2 [1,p+1] The session key is SKAB = T Ua (T Ub (x))mod p Algorithm 1: The proposed 3PAKA protocol
Step 2: Step 6: A and B check the validity of N B and N A , respectively. If the checking holds, SKAB = T Ua (T Ub (x))mod p is the shared session key between A and B.
Password change phase
Each user can update his password as follows.
Step 
and then he sends {C i ,T c (x)} to S.
Step 2: In the registration phase, she sends {UID A ,VG A } to the server, then receives {VUPW A } from it. All communications in this phase are carried out over secure channel sch. In authenticated key agreement phase, user A sends message 3 to remote server, and wait for message 6 from remote server, after that she computes session key SKAB and the authenticate message N A , and sends it to user B. This phase can run more than once. User A is defined as:
let UserA = new rA: bitstring; let VGA = h1((upwA, rA)) in out(sch, (UIDA, VGA)); in(sch, xVUPWA: bitstring); let dA = H((UBIOA, upwA)) in let VRA = xor(H(UBIOA), rA) in !( let dA' = H((UBIOA, upwA)) in if dA' = dA then new Ua: bitstring; let TUA = T(Ua, x) in let KAS = T(Ua, T(Sk, x)) in let rA = xor(H(UBIOA), VRA) in let VGA = h1((upwA, rA)) in let FVA = h((UIDA, UIDB, T(Ua, x), VGA)) in let CVA = senc((UIDA, UIDB, T(Ua, x), FVA), KAS) in event UserARequest(UIDA); out(cch, (CVA, T(Ua, x))); in(cch, xRVAS: bitstring); let (xS1: bitstring, xTUB: bitstring, xUIDA: bitstring, xZVAS: bitstring) = sdec(xRVAS, KAS) in if xZVAS = h((UIDA, UIDB, xTUB, xS1)) then let SKAB = T(Ua, xTUB) in let NA = h((UIDA, SKAB)) in out(cch, NA); in(cch, xNB: bitstring); if xNB = h((UIDB, SKAB)) then event UserBAuthed(UIDB) ). User B is defined as: let UserB = new rB: bitstring; let VGB = h1((upwB, rB)) in out(sch, (UIDB, VGB)); in(sch, xVUPWB: bitstring); let dB = H((UBIOB, upwB)) in let VRB = xor(H(UBIOB), rB) in !( let dB' = H((UBIOB, upwB)) in if dB' = dB then in(cch, xCVB: bitstring); let rB = xor(H(UBIOB), VRB) in let VGB = h1((upwB, rB)) in let (xTUA: bitstring, xFVB: bitstring, xUIDA: bitstring, xUIDB: bitstring) = sdec(xCVB, VGB) in if xFVB = h((xTUA, UIDB)) then new Ub: bitstring; let HVB = h((UIDB, T(Ub, x))) in let PVB = senc((T (Ub, x) , HVB, xCVB), VGB) in event UserBResponse(UIDB); out(cch, (xCVB, PVB)); in(cch, xRVBS: bitstring); let (xS2: bitstring, xTUA: bitstring, xUIDB: bitstring, xZVBS: bitstring) = sdec(xRVBS, VGB) in if xZVBS = h((xUIDA, UIDB, xTUA, xS2)) then let SKBA = T(Ub, xTUA) in let NB = h((UIDB, SKBA)) in out(cch, NB); in(cch, xNA: bitstring); if xNA = h((xUIDA, SKBA)) then event UserAAuthed(xUIDA) ).
The remote server includes two components which run in parallel. The first component represents registration request from new users. We define this component as:
let RegS = in(sch, (sUIDI: bitstring, sVGI: bitstring)); let VUPWI = add(h1((sUIDI, Sk)), sVGI) in let VUPW(sUIDI) = VUPWI in out(sch, VUPWI). The second one represents the registered users' authentication key agreement request. When the remote server receives message 3, he computes CV B and sends message 4 to user B. After receives message 5 from user B, he computes RV AS , RV BS and sends message 6, 7 respectively to user A, user B. We define this component as:
let AuthS = in(cch, (sCVA: bitstring, sTUA: bitstring)); let sKAS = T(Sk, sTUA) in let (sUIDA: bitstring, sUIDB: bitstring, sTUA': bitstring, sFVA: bitstring) = sdec(sCVA, sKAS) in let sVGA = sub(VUPW(sUIDA), h1((sUIDA, Sk))) in if sFVA = h((sUIDA, sUIDB, sTUA', sVGA)) then let FVB = h((sTUA', sUIDB)) in let sVGB = sub(VUPW(sUIDB), h1((sUIDB, Sk))) in let CVB = senc((sTUA', FVB, sUIDA, sUIDB), sVGB) in out(cch, CVB); in(cch, (sCVB: bitstring, sPVB: bitstring)); let (sTUB: bitstring, sHVB: bitstring, sCVB': bitstring) = sdec(sPVB, sVGB) in if sHVB = h((sUIDB, sTUB)) then new S1: bitstring; new S2: bitstring; let ZVAS = h((sUIDA, sUIDB, sTUB, S1)) in let RVAS = senc((S1, sTUB, sUIDA, ZVAS), sKAS) in let ZVBS = h((sUIDA, sUIDB, sTUA', S2)) in let RVBS = senc((S2, sTUA', sUIDB, ZVBS), sVGB) in out(cch, RVAS); out(cch, RVBS). The Server is defined as a parallel execution of its two components: let Server = (!(RegS)|!(AuthS)). The protocol is the parallel execution of the above parts: process !UserA|!UserB|Server The third part formalizes the security property, in particular, it defines the queries that the ProVerif tool will validate. ProVerif verifies the security attributes by checking assertions according to the query statements. It verifies session key security by checking the attacker query. The session key security verification code is shown below. where attacker(SKAB) means that the attacker can eavesdrop or calculate user A's session keySKAB.
query attacker(SKAB). query attacker(SKBA). Proverif verifies the authentication attribute by checking the corresponding assertion of the event. An event is an indicator used specifically for authentication validation in Proverif. In the formal model, the authentications processes are modeled as two relations: one relation for user A to authenticate user B and another for user B to authenticate user A. The formal relations are defined as: query id: bitstring; inj-event(UserAAuthed(id)) = = > inj-event(UserARequest(id)). query id: bitstring; inj-event(UserBAuthed(id)) = = > inj-event(UserBResponse(id)). We perform the above process in the ProVerif version 1.95. Fig 1 demonstrates that the correspondence queries are true, and the attacker queries are not true. The first result implies that the authentication attribute is satisfied in the presented protocol. The latter result means that the attackers can't gain the session key, therefore the session key is safe. 
Informal analysis
In this section, we discuss that the proposed protocol can resist various known attacks.
7.2.1 User anonymity. In the proposed scheme, the users' identities are are protected by symmetric cryptographic algorithms and hash functions. Therefore, the adversary can not obtain users' identities without knowing the secret keys. So the proposed protocol can provide user anonymity.
Password guessing attacks.
In the proposed protocol, the users' passwords are contained in VG i = h 1 (upw i ,r i ), and r i = H(UBIO i )ÈVR i , where r i is protected by users' biometrics UBIO i , therefore, even if an adversary can obtains {VR i ,d i } stored in users' memory, he/she still can not get users' passwords.
7.2.3 Known-key security. In our scheme, the session key SKAB = T Ua (T Ub (x))mod p depends on two random numbers Ua and Ub, which varies in different sessions. Thus, the attacker cannot compute previous or future session keys even if he knows the current session key. B , hence, he cannot compute the valid message to pass through the server's authentication. If the attacker wants to impersonate the remote server, he needs the server's secret key Sk, the verifier messages VUPW A and VUPW B , which are unaccessable to him. 7.2.7 Man-in-the-middle attack. According to the above analysis, it is impossible for the adversary to launch impersonation attack and replay attack on our protocol. As a result, our protocol can resist the man-in-the-middle attack. Tables 1 and 2 show the security and computational cost comparison between our scheme and some related protocols. For convenience, some notations are used here: let T be the unit time for performing one Chebyshev polynomial computation, E be the unit time for one symmetric encryption/decryption and H be the unit time for one hashing. Table 1 shows that our protocol owns more secutity properties than other related protocols. According to the protocol proposed by Xue and Hong [37] , the actual execution time is as follows: T is about 32.2ms, E is about 0.45ms and H is about 0.2ms. From Table 2 , we know that our protocol is more efficient than other related schemes.
Security and computation comparisons

Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that Lu et al.'s attacks on Xie et al.'s scheme are untenable, and further pointed out that their improved protocol is insecure, which suffers from offline password guessing attack and stolen-verifier attack. Therefore, we proposed an improved protocol to eliminate their security vulnerabilities. We showed that our improved protocol possesses user anonymity, known session key security and withstands impersonation attack, reply attack, man-in-the-middle attack, etc. Also, we verified our protocol achieves mutual authentication and the secutity of the session key. Finally, the performance comparison showed that the efficiency of our scheme is higher than other related schemes. In the future, we will apply our protocol to verify its performance in real scenarios. 
